On May 4th 2010 the Center for EU Enlargement Studies in cooperation with the Intitute of World Economics held a workshop entiteled "The echo of the new members – The Visegrad Group and EU external action"

The following Event Report has been contributed by Annamaria Kiss

Cooperation among the Visegrad countries can look back upon past experiences stretching back many centuries, even if this history is fragmented by episodes of conflict and even war. Beyond the efforts to cooperate, Visegrad countries also share a rich pool of experiences, most recently associated with the transition from state socialism to a functioning market economies and democratic political orders modelled after those of old EU member states. A key juncture in these efforts has been euroatlantic integration through NATO membership and accession to the EU, which represent a boundary of sorts: the question of “rejoining” Europe seems solved, yielding its place to the more complex issue of how to function in the new communities, exploring vistas for further cooperation or going separate ways.

The workshop saw distinguished experts (Elsa Tulmets - Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Prague; Agnieszka Łada – Head of the European Programme at the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, Tomáš Strážay - Program Director at Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association in Bratislava; András Deák - Research Director at Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CENS-CEU) in Budapest, and David Král – the Director of EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Prague) engage in sketching out an image of the situation through comparing the varying Euiropean and atlanticist visions and preferences of the Visegrad countries with the ultimate aim of exploring realistic options for continued cooperation.

Elsa Tulmets emphasized that despite individual strategies of accession and divergent priorities, the Visegrad countries have held onto a commitment of consultation which has over time become internalized by governmental elites. While not prescribing with mandatory force any specific cooperation in sectors of policy-making, it has been sufficient for all players to adopt the mentality that if interests coalesce, there are natural regional partners to be found and that cooperation with these partners can yield pay-offs. As a result of this slow cognitive institutionalization process, areas emerge where cooperation – even in the absence of formal contractual obligations – becomes the norm for the Visegrad countries. This is especially true of post-accession strategies, be it the regular pre-Council consultations of heads of government in Brussels or the common commitment to promoting norm and knowledge transfer at the EU periphery. In the future, these logics will likely be reinforced further by overlapping interests as f.i. in energy policy and visa regimes in the EU.

David Král interpreted primarily those factors in Czech politics which work against more predictable and balanced patterns of Visegrad cooperation in foreign policy. He emphasized the secondary importance of foreign policy for the Czech public and the related lack of a clearly defined foreign policy identity. As a result, Czech commitments on occasion seem to be more (perhaps honest, but still) rhetorics than substance as f.i. in the case of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, there exists no established and well-defined sense of deep cooperative engagement whether with regional partners or major players such as Germany and the US. Coupled with the crisis-ridden period after 2004, this lack has been instrumental in preventing the institutionalization of foreign policy patterns.

András Deák accentuated the historical determination of the situation of Hungary which results in a “necessary partnership” with Visegrad countries. This partnership to which Hungarian politics has produced no real alternative does in fact provide real payoffs for the country, but there exists no systematically thought-through vision of the benefits the V4 may offer to Budapest. Hungarian preferences do not have critical mass on their own, and although asymmetrical partnership such as with the US offer tangible benefits as well, Hungarian capabilities for foreign policy actions would be greatly increased by more conscious reliance on the convergent foreign policy interests of Visegrad countries.

Agnieszka Łada registered the relative success of Polish foreign policy to have its strategic designs as f.i. in the case of the Eastern Partnership recognized, an achievement that has been accorded increased domestic attention since the perceived abandonment of Polish regional interests by the US. There is, as a result, a sense of awareness to work in and for Europe, especially in the context of the approaching presidency of the Council, yet a clear programme on many intra-European issues that would lend weight to the Presidency are still missing. If these are successfully hammered out in the near future – aided potentially by the know-how of NGOs waiting to cooperate with the government – Polish actions and preferences on the Eastern periphery and the broader field of European external relations may carry significant weight in the upcoming policy cycle.

Tomáš Strážay emphasized that while 2016 and thus the Slovakian presidency of the Council is still far away, it will be approaching with seemingly increasing velocity and will certainly have a bearing on V4 relations. Both energy policy and the Eastern Partnership would be natural areas for Slovakian politics to build a Visegrad coalition, yet a strategic undertaking seems to be hampered by the divergence of domestic (chiefly party) preferences on the issue, which has its roots in contradictory attitudes to the Russian presence in the region and in various policy sectors.

Despite domestic factors hampering cooperation and occasional political differences, fundamental common policy interests offer numerous options for coordinated action for V4 countries. Working towards defining elements of a shared foreign policy/external relations identity would go a long way in marking out areas for strategic cooperation. While there is reason for caution in theorizing this identity, experts agreed that following a proper “diagnosis” of the ailments of the Visegrad cooperation, it should prove possible to revise various divergent foreign policy stances, based on a better understanding of the potential of joint action.